Article 16 of the Greek Constitution stipulates that higher education is provided free in state institutions, and that private universities are prohibited. The paper digs into the historical origins of such provisions and discusses the reasons why, in spite of national outcry, the article has survived with no revision since it first appeared several decades ago. Closely linked to article 16, is the fact Greece has a world record of students studying abroad relative to its population. Standard economic analysis is used to assess the net social cost to the country of maintaining article 16. Links are made to the quality of university education provided by the state institutions, the foreign exchange drain to universities abroad, the lack of the benefits of competition by not allowing foreign universities to set up campuses in Greece, as well as the benefits of having foreign-educated graduates returning to Greece. The above efficiency arguments are complemented by distributional considerations on who has benefited, or lost, by the free state provision of university education. _________ * I am grateful to Alexander Sarris for discussing several points in this paper. Fini Koutsougera, Aris Stamoulas and Stergios Tasoulas provided excellent research assistance.
I. Introduction
Unbelievable as it might be, the following are extracts from the present Greek Constitution that became law in 1975 and is still in effect today (paragraph numbers in parenthesis):
-"Art and science, research and teaching shall be free and their development and promotion shall be an obligation of the State". (1) -
"All Greeks are entitled to free education at all levels at State educational institutions". (4) -"Education at university level shall be provided exclusively by institutions which are … public law legal persons … under the supervision of the State". (5) -"Professors of university level institutions shall be public functionaries … [and] … shall not be dismissed …". (6) -"The establishment of university level institutions by private persons is prohibited" (8).
Official Translation, Hellenic Parliament (1995) , pp 24-25.
Since the first Greek Constitution of 1864, with one exception, article 16 refers to education. The following are highlights of the contents of article 16, as they evolved in several revisions, or non-revisions, of the Constitution. (Svolos, 1998, p. 178) .
. Article 16 is very lean, consisting of only two sentences: -"Higher 1 education functions at the expense of the state, while in basic education the State contributes according to the needs of the municipalities." -" Everyone has the right to establish educational institutions, conforming to the State laws"

1911.
Article 16 now has three sentences:
-"Education, being under the supervision of the state, functions at the State's expense".
-"Basic education is compulsory for all, and is offered free by the State".
-"Private and legal persons are allowed to establish private schools functioning according to the rules of the Constitution and State laws". (Svolos, 1998, p. 191) .
1927.
The article referring to education changes to number 23. It essentially repeats the clauses of the 1911 Constitution, with a major difference in the first sentence, now adding the municipalities as financiers of education: (Svolos, 1998, p. 215) .
1952.
The Constitution reverts to article 16 for education, where for the first time university education is mentioned: (Svolos, 1998, p. 255-256) .
There have also been constitutional revisions in 1996 and 2001. In such revisions, article 16 was preserved intact as in the 1975 Constitution. Since the Constitution itself sets time limits regarding revisions, the stipulations of article 16, as outlined above, will remain in effect until at least 2008.
In the 1996 window for revision, the opposition party of New Democracy proposed several amendments to article 16: -Only public higher education should be offered by institutions that are public legal persons.
Individuals or legal persons are allowed to establish institutions of higher education for non-profit, under the supervision of the state -Only university professors teaching at state universities are civil servants -Deletion of the clause that the establishment of universities by individuals is prohibited. (Hellenic Parliament, 1996, p. 14) .
Although none of the above passed, one may wonder what would be the incentive for someone to establish a non-for-profit institution, and what would be the quality of that institution if it were under the supervision of the state.
II. Effects of the Law
Greece is characterized by an insatiable demand for education, and higher education in particular, that has been the subject of several studies. (Nasiakou 1981 , Psacharopoulos and Soumelis 1979 , Tsoukalas 1981 . The dominant explanation of such phenomenon is that in a period of massive rural-urban migration, parents saw education as a means of escaping from the village and for social mobility. Of course such mechanism is in operation in every country in the World, although Greece is an outlier, as documented below.
It is evident that laws of physics and basic arithmetic, if not economics, conflict with the stipulations of article 16 of the Constitution -it is not possible to provide free higher education to all those who want it. Something has to yield in the process. In the case of Greece this has been quantity rationing, quality degradation, graduate unemployment, massive student exodus abroad, brain drain, foreign exchange loss, resources misallocation, regressive social transfers, reduced human capital investment and social unrest. Kalamatianou, Karmas and Lianos 1988) . The latter were instituted with the aid of a World Bank loan in the seventies, with the explicit purpose to "break the one-way street from the lyceum to the university and provide the middle level technical manpower that the country allegedly needed." (SeeWorld Bank 1970).
Quantity rationing.
There is a sharp contrast between the early period and today. In 1975, the number of those seeking entry into tertiary education was less than the number of lyceum graduates, and only 19% of the candidates entered a proper university. About one quarter of the entrants to tertiary education had to study the short-cycle. By 1996 the number of candidates was nearly doubled. Only 16% entered university, while about one half of the entrants to tertiary education were obliged to enroll in the low demand short technological cycle. (See Figure 1) . 1 9 7 7 1 9 7 9 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 1 Source: Table A-1 This impasse led to education reform Law 2525 in 1997, the essence of which was to toughen graduation from the lyceum so that eventually all lyceum graduates would find a tertiary education place. The law led to a quadruple of those failing to graduate from the lyceum in the next few years and counter reforms have been announced to deal with the situation.
Quality degradation. The constitutional provision of free higher education necessarily implies a compromise on quality. "At the present state, one cannot talk Candidates All entrants University entrants about university institutions". So states a review of the Greek higher education system by the OECD, (1996, p. 65).
2 Table 1 presents three quality proxies of Greek higher education. Overall, Greece spends about one half per university student relative to the average spent by other OECD countries in constant purchasing power prices. In addition, the constitutional prohibition of private universities in Greece, and the civil servant status of professors have contributed to the deterioration of quality because of the lack of competition. It is well known that university professors have little incentive to publish after they are appointed with tenure for life.
And with good reason, since they have to work at the same time in a variety of parallel jobs to survive financially. At present, the salary of a university lecturer is about the same as the wage of an unskilled illegal immigrant. The policy towards expansion of the non-university tertiary education is also dictated by another reason. The short cycle costs €1,500 per student/year, which is about one third the cost of a student in a 4+ years universiy. Thus, expansion of the technological institutes accommodates more students with the fixed state budget --a direct result of the "free" education.
Graduate Unemployment. One would expect that the tight state control and determination of the exact number of entrants to each individual school and institution of tertiary education might alleviate the feared risk of unemployment, relative to a more liberal situation. This is far from the truth. Greece, of course for reasons not only related to education, has one of the highest overall unemployment rates of those aged under 25 in the European Union --29.5% versus 16.16% for the Union as a whole. Unemployment among tertiary education graduates aged under 24 stands at 28.8%, relative to 12.8% for the Union as a whole (Eurostat 2000) .
A recent survey by the Federation of Greek Industries found that, in the midst of unemployment, two out of three enterprises find it difficult to fill their higher-level vacancies. One reason is the maintenance of outdated university departments and curricula that do not correspond to today's market needs. (See Glytsos 1990).
A related reason must be that students do not enroll in the courses they really want --students must be more in tune with the demands of the market, rather than the Ministry of Education. For example, in 2001 there were 20,824 applications for courses in informatics and telecommunications, but the state offered only 125 places. By contrast, only 15% of those studying accounting in the Technological Institutes stated that this was the course of their first choice.
Student Exodus abroad.
A parallel development has been that, over the years, the excess demand for higher education found an outlet abroad. Table A -2 in the Annex shows the distribution of Greek students between domestic and foreign institutions. Today, by the most conservative estimates, four out of ten Greek university students study in a foreign country. When the short non-university cycle is included, one out of five Greek tertiary education students are enrolled in foreign institutions. Table 2 shows the number of foreign students in the top sending countries. Greece is number four regarding the absolute number of students studying abroad. But when one takes into account the size of the population, Greece is the undisputable World leader. (See Figure 2) . 
Figure 2. Tertiary Education Students in Foreign Countries per one Million Domestic Population
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Another effect of the rationing of tertiary education places, is that students do not study what they really want, even if they excelled at the entrance examinations. It is typical that at the 2001 university entry examinations, candidates with an average grade of 19 (out of a maximum of 20) did not enter the university school of their choice.
Brain Drain. It is common knowledge that many Greek students, after completing their studies abroad, do not return to their home country. (See Eliou 1988 , Kouvertaris 1973 . More importantly, there is high selectivity on who returns and who does not.
Graduates of doubtful quality universities in Eastern European countries do return, simply because they cannot be absorbed in the international market. But the best graduates of Anglo-Saxon universities are offered academic or business jobs abroad and do not return. Or they may return near retirement. Faculties of the best universities in the world are full of first generation Greek names.
After all, why should a young Ph.D. from MIT seek a lecturer's appointment in a Greek university, given the state of university education described above?
Foreign exchange loss. Based on data on student fees and living expenses in the countries that receive Greek students, it is estimated that the average student spends €12,707 per year. (Table 3) . Thus, in 1999, Greek students studying abroad spent €743m. This is about 10% of the foreign exchange Greece gets from tourism, or half percent of the gross domestic product. 
Misallocation of resources.
The competitiveness for university entry has given rise to a proliferation of cram schools called "frontisteria". Each year, over one billion Euros is spent on preparatory courses for succeeding at the university entrance examinations. This is more than what the state spends on secondary schools. Such resources could have been used for improving the quality of instruction, if the money flowed through private hands.
Another diversion of resources, also adding to the anxiety of students and their families, is the famous DIKATSA (Interuniversity Center for the Recognition of Foreign Academic Titles). The Center receives each year 25,000 applications of graduates from foreign univerisites, the processing time of which may exceed one year. During that time, applicants remain unemployed.
Reduced human capital investment. These days, countries try by all means to encourage human capital investment, as all studies show that this is the most critical factor for economic growth. It has been amply documented that in Greece, investment in education is privately and socially profitable. (See Magoula and Psacharopoulos 1999) . Although in Greece families are willing to pay for the education of their children, article 16 of the Constitution puts a break to such investment.
Social agony.
Nowhere else in the world, with the possible exception of Japan, the annual tertiary education entry examinations immobilize the nation. The exams make newspaper headlines describing the agony students and their families go through until, and if, a university place is secured.
Benefits. Of course the student exodus is not only associated with costs. It must have also resulted in some benefits, namely having some students study in much better quality institutions relative to domestic universities. But all in all, the cost -benifit balance sheet is clearly in the red.
III. The welfare cost
It is possible, at least in principle, using standard economic analysis to arrive at a gross estimate of the welfare cost incurred by Greece, as a result of article 16 of the Constitution.
The basic parameters are as follows:
-Applications for tertiary entry at zero price: 120,000 -Potential domestic students, if no rationing: 480,000 (= 4 x 120,000) -Greek students in domestic universities: 250,000 -Greek students abroad: 65,000 -Total number of students (domestic + abroad): 315,000 -Academic direct cost per domestic university student: $4,000
-Direct cost of a student studying abroad: $13,000
The problem is that we know only one point of the underlying demand for higher education (D), namely the intersection of it with the horizontal axis (480,000 students would be enrolled at any given point in time, at zero cost to them). Neither do we know its elasticity, or another point on it. It is true that 65,000 students are willing to pay $13,000 per year to study abroad. But this point might lie on another demand curve reflecting higher quality. In addition, we do not know how many students would be willing to pay what price in order to study in Greece rather than going abroad --probably a price below $13.000. (See Figure 3 ).
There must also be an upward sloping supply curve for providing university services (S). Under no restrictions, the optimal price-quantity combination would be at point M. If this supply curve represents the true resource cost of education, the state subsidy shifts the supply curve downwards, to S', by $4,000. This is the classic case of the welfare loss of a subsidy, split into the following components:
-A consumer surplus gain equal to the area FMCE -A producer surplus gain equal to the area ABMF -Such gains were obtained at a cost equal to the area ABCE -Hence there is a net welfare loss equal to the triangle BMC.
Perhaps more important that the triangle, however, are the rectangle transfers involved:
-$ 845m go to pay services abroad (65,000 foreign students x $13,000) -$ 2.3b go to subsidize those who attend universities (250,000 x $9,000). 4 We know that the last transfer, representing nearly 2% of the GDP, is regressive. Tsakloglou and Antonitis (1999) have documented for Greece what applies to nearly all countries in the world, namely that in kind higher education subsidies (as the one in Greece), benefits mostly the richer segments of the population.
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The transfer abroad raises the issue why this money, or part of it, could not have been used to set up a private university in Greece to accommodate, for pay, those who are rejected by the state. IV. The Platonian University Dimarogonas (1989) conducted a feasibility study of a hypothetical "Platonian University" in Greece with an enrollment of 15,000 aiming to capture part of student exodus. (See also Dimarogonas, 1995) . Based on his parameters regarding the faculty composition and technical specifications, Table 4 presents the operating account of a potential private university in Greece today enrolling 30,000 students, i.e. less than half of those now abroad. Dimarogonas (1989) , ESYE (2002) In round figures, the €E3,000 cost per student is less than what the state now spends per student because the composition of the Platonian University does not have expensive faculties such as medicine. In addition, whatever is spent per student in a private university will be spent more efficiently relative to what is happening at present in state universities.
The tuition of €5,800 is less than half of what Greek students now spend abroad, hence they would be willing to pay it in order to stay at home and not incur the significant living expenses in a foreign country. Given a modest consultancy and services revenue, the €100m operating profit is a reality.
Assuming 20 years for the depreciation of buildings and 5-10 years for other capital equipment, the initial investment to set up a private university in Greece is less than €500m. This is a very modest sum, relative to the projected profit.
Of course the word "profit", especially regarding education, is an anathema in Greece. Remember that the opposition party when proposing an amendment to article 16 of the Constitution, called for non-profit private universities. Since public opinion is so opposed to the notion of profit, there is a wide margin for using the operating surplus to provide fellowships to needy students.
V. Conclusion
Beyond any reasonable doubt, article 16 of the Greek Constitution is an economically inefficient and socially inequitable law costing the country billions of Euros in tangible terms, and an unknown amount of other social costs that are not easy to quantify. But the actuarial value of the cost should be huge, given the fact article 16 undermines the nation's human capital formation.
Alas, public opinion in Greece is against private universities.
6 Andreas Papandreou, during the discussion of article 16 in the plenary session of Parliament in 1975, said: "We do not agree that the schools of higher education should be subject to property, or that they might be governed privately, by Greeks or foreigners, especially foreigners. …those teaching in private schools should be equated 7 to civil servants. (Hellenic Parliament, 1975b, p. 496) .
Even those who dare to propose private universities, specify that they should be non-profit. Clearly, Schumpeter has not been read in Greece. "… if in the Constitution we create a Procrustean bed, we will pay a high price for it for a long time" (Hellenic Parliament, 1975b, p. 496) .
Whatever he meant, it is ironic, if not comico-tragic, that he turned out to be so right. 
